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Corporate Liability for Human 
Rights Violations: The Future of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act 
Milena Sterio* 
Introduction 
In October 2017, the United States Supreme Court will entertain 
oral arguments in Jesner v. Arab Bank, a case involving the scope of 
corporate liability for human rights abuses under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (“ATCA”).1 In Jesner, a group of terrorist attacks victims 
in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank have sued a Jordan-based bank, 
alleging that the bank supported and financed terrorism through 
maintaining accounts for known terrorists, accepting donations that it 
knew would be used to fund terrorism, and distributing so-called 
“martyrdom payments” to families of suicide bombers.2 The bank has 
denied any wrong-doing and has emphasized its self-described role as 
an active and leading partner in socio-economic development in the 
Middle East.3 The legal issue before the Supreme Court is not whether 
the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, but instead whether the bank, as a 
corporate entity, can be sued in United States’ court at all, under the 
ATCA.   
The issue of corporate liability under the ATCA was already 
litigated in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.4 In Kiobel, however, 
the Supreme Court did not ultimately determine whether corporations 
can be held liable under the ATCA.5 Instead, the Court determined 
that the ATCA was presumptively territorial, and that the plaintiffs 
in Kiobel could not overcome the presumption of territoriality.6 Thus, 
the Court held that cases brought under the ACTA had to “touch 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  I would like to thank the organizers 
of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Conference, 
“Corporations on Trial,” where I was able to present a draft of this 
article.   
1. Amy Howe, An Introduction to the Alien Tort Statute and Corporate 
Liability: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 24, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/introduction-alien-tort-statute-
corporate-liability-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/86UU-43QT ]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id.  
4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
5. Id. at 1669. 
6. Id.  
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and concern” the United States in order to proceed under this Act 
and that the alleged conduct in Kiobel did not sufficiently concern 
United States’ interests.7   
Kiobel left many questions unanswered. First, circuit courts have 
been split as to how to interpret the territoriality requirement under 
the ATCA.8 In this regard, the holding of ATCA cases typically fall 
into one of three categories: (1)  that the alleged tortious conduct had 
to have occurred within the United States, (2) that only 
relevant/some tortious conduct had to have taken place on American 
soil, or (3) that the presence of American parties to the litigation may 
be sufficient to overcome the presumption of territoriality.9 Second, 
Kiobel did not address the issue of applicable law, namely whether 
domestic or international law should apply to the issue of whether 
corporations can be sued under the ATCA?10 Those in favor of 
corporate liability prefer the application of domestic law, which may 
lead to an easier conclusion that corporations can be sued and held 
liable under the Act, while those opposed to corporate liability may 
prefer the application of international law, under which it is uncertain 
whether corporations may incur civil liability.11  Lastly, Kiobel did not 
answer the most fundamental issue: whether corporations may be 
sued under the ATCA, and if so, under what circumstances?12  
This Paper will address these complex legal issues in light of and 
in the context of the Jesner case. In Part I, this Paper will provide a 
brief overview of the Jesner case. In Part II, this Paper will outline 
the Kiobel case and its holding. In Part III, this Paper will discuss 
Kiobel’s shortcomings, including the vagueness of its “touch and 
concern” test and its failure to specify which law – international or 
domestic – applies to the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA. 
In Part IV, this paper will then propose other remedies to address 
corporate misbehavior and complicity in the violation of human 
rights, including criminal liability and lawsuits against corporate 
officers. In sum, this paper will conclude that the ATCA may not be 
the best vehicle to address corporate violations of human rights 
(although, in the author’s humble opinion, the Supreme Court will 
most likely decide for the plaintiffs in the Jesner case, and in favor of 
corporate liability under the ATCA).   
 
7. Id. 
8. Id.   
9. See Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1671.   
10. See generally Kiobel, 133 S.Ct.,(failing to answer the question of 
whether domestic or international law should be used in ATCA cases).  
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See generally Kiobel, 133 S.Ct., (failing to answer the question of 
whether corporations may be sued under the ATCA). 
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I. Jesner v. Arab Bank 
Jordan’s Arab Bank was founded in Jerusalem nearly a century 
ago.13 As of today, it has over 600 branches on five continents.14 In 
light of its work with the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
as well as other organizations, such as Oxfam, Save the Children, and 
Catholic Relief Services, Arab Bank has described itself as “an active 
and leading partner in the socio-economic development” of the Middle 
East.15 Both the United States’ and the Israeli governments have 
worked with the bank - the former has characterized it as a 
“constructive partner” in the efforts to prevent terrorism financing 
and the latter has used Arab Bank as a conduit to transfer taxes 
collected for the Palestinian Authority.16   
Despite this seemingly positive image of Arab Bank, a group of 
plaintiffs has recently sued the bank in United States’ federal court.17 
The plaintiffs, a group of victims of terrorist attacks committed in 
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1995 and 2005, allege that 
Arab Bank aided and abetted terrorist activity, by maintaining 
accounts for known terrorists, accepting donations that would be used 
to fund terrorism, and distributing millions of dollars to families of 
suicide bombers (so-called “martyrdom payments”).18 The plaintiffs’ 
law suit was filed under the ACTA - a federal law, enacted as part of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over 
“any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”19 It is unclear as 
 
13. Howe, supra note 1.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. See Complaint at *1-2, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. CV 06 3869, 
2006 WL 4807223 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006) (listing the parties’ names). 
18. Id. at *38.  
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1948); See generally, Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & 
Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 447 (2011) (discussing the history and meaning of 
the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney General Bradford’s Opinion and 
the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 509 (2012) (explaining 
debates over the ATS and the reliance by participants in those debates 
on a 1795 opinion by U.S. Attorney General William Bradford); Curtis 
A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
587, 588 (2002) (detailing the history of the ATS); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International 
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 870 
(2007) (analyzing the Court’s Sosa decision within the context of its 
Erie decision and considering several areas of likely debate concerning 
the ATS); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort 
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to why ATCA was enacted; Judge Friendly famously stated that “no 
one seems to know whence it came,” and described this act as a “kind 
of a judicial Lohengrin,” after the mythical German knight who 
suddenly arrives by boat pulled by swans.20   
ATCA remained dormant until 1980, when two Paraguayan 
citizens filed a lawsuit in United States’ federal court under this act, 
alleging that a Paraguayan police official tortured their son and 
brother to death.21 This case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, effectively 
resurrected the ATCA and established the precedent that United 
States’ courts will hear cases involving violations of international law 
norms committed against alien plaintiffs.22 In the three decades 
following Filartiga, plaintiffs began to increasingly rely on the ATCA 
to bring suits against foreign defendants and government officials, but 
also large multinational corporations, for their role in aiding and 
abetting human rights violations committed by foreign governments.23 
In light of such increasing reliance on the ATCA, since Filartiga, the 
Supreme Court has twice weighed in to limit the scope and reach of 
the ATCA.24 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held 
that the ATCA is purely a jurisdictional statute which does not 
 
Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 
689 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that “the Framers wanted to 
give the federal courts jurisdiction over suits involving the law of 
nations”); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: 
International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 463, 466 (1997) (discussing Filartiga, “[t]he break-through ATCA 
case”); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: 
What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (noting a debate concerning the 
ATS: whether it merely grants jurisdiction or allows suits to be brought 
on the basis of “customary international law”); Julian G. Ku, The 
Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 353 
(2011) (challenging the common perception that the ATS “imposes 
liability on private corporations for violations of customary international 
law”); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 830 (2006) (advancing the “safe-
conduct theory,” which posits a new role for the ATS—it would permit 
redress of common law torts that private actors commit so long as there 
is a U.S. nexus); Carlos M. Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status 
of Customary International Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 531 (2012) 
(observing that most scholarly debate on customary international law 
has focused on litigation over the ATS). 
20. IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
21. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
22. Id. at 888-89.  
23. Howe, supra note 1.   
24. Id.   
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provide plaintiffs with a cause of action.25 Instead, the Supreme Court 
held that causes of action for lawsuits filed under the ATCA must be 
found under the common law, formulated by judges.26The Supreme 
Court then held that the common law as of 1789, when the ATCA 
was enacted, would have contained a narrow set of violations of the 
law of nations, including violations of safe-passage guarantees, 
violations of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.27 Thus, according 
to the Sosa Supreme Court majority, claims brought under the ATCA 
should proceed only if they allege such 18th century-recognized causes 
of action and if they are widely accepted as a violation of 
international norms.28 The Court further specified its holding by 
cautioning that “the determination whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably 
must) involve an element of judgment about the practical 
consequences of “allowing litigants to rely on that norm.29 In addition, 
the Court held that courts considering claims filed under the ATCA 
should take into account not only whether international law 
recognizes the allegedly violated norm, but also whether international 
law would allow a particular defendant to face liability “if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”30 In 
Sosa, the Court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s cause of action, 
alleging arbitrary detention as a violation of customary international 
law, should not be recognized under the ATCA because the 
prohibition on arbitrary detention had not reached the status of a 
customary norm of law, sufficiently accepted and universal under 
international law.31 
Post-Sosa, federal courts hearing ATCA claims faced 
uncertainty.32 The Sosa holding did not clarify which types of claims 
could be potentially recognized as providing a valid cause of action 
under the ATCA.33 In addition, the Sosa holding left open the issue of 
corporate liability for aiding and abetting in human rights abuses: 
could corporations face liability under the ATCA, or should this 
 
25. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).   
26. Id. at 724. 
27. Id. at. 715, 724-25. 
28. Id. at 725. 
29. Id. at 732-33. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 738. 
32. Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the 
Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1096-97 
(2014). 
33. Id. at 1096-97.  
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statute be interpreted as confining lawsuits thereunder as against 
private defendants only.34 This issue was raised in the second ATCA-
related Supreme Court case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.35 
Section II below will discuss the Kiobel case in detail, and it will 
explain how the Kiobel case left several questions unanswered, 
including the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA.36 Because 
lower courts have been reaching conflicting results on this issue, the 
Supreme Court (presumably) granted certiorari in Jesner. 37 
Jesner plaintiffs allege that Arab Bank “violated the law of 
nations insofar as it financed terrorism, and also insofar as it directly 
and indirectly engaged in genocide and crimes against humanity.”38 
According to the plaintiffs, when ACTA was enacted it was 
“unquestionable” that corporations could face liability in tort law, and 
this has remained true until today.39 Thus, according to the plaintiffs, 
the ACTA should be interpreted to include corporations as potential 
defendants.40 While the text of the ATCA limits plaintiffs to “aliens,” 
the statute does not contain a similar limitation as to defendants.41 
Moreover, plaintiffs interpret the history and purpose of the ATCA to 
support their argument that this statute applies to corporations.42 
They argue that Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 to ensure, 
inter alia, that federal courts had jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging 
violations of the law of nations, such as, for example, an assault on a 
foreign diplomat.43 According to the plaintiffs, there is no reason to 
believe that Congress wanted to avoid foreign relations problems 
created by individuals but not by corporations.44 In addition, plaintiffs 
argue that it is important to hold corporations liable in order to 
compensate victims and deter future ATCA violations.45 In cases 
involving the offense of terrorism financing, plaintiffs argue that 
 
34. Id.   
35. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. 
36. See infra Part II.  
37. George Rutherglen, Jesner v. Arab: Closing the Door to Human Rights 
in Federal Court?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 5, 2017, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/45632/jesner-v-arab-bank-plc-closing-door-
human-rights-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/4MJ3-ALVS]. 
38. Howe, supra note 1.   
39. Id.  
40. Id.  
41. Id. 
42. Id.  
43. Id.   
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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“corporate liability is the only meaningful option” because, even if a 
plaintiff can correctly identify the individuals involved in the actual 
wrongdoing, “securing jurisdiction and collecting judgment against 
them would be even more difficult.”46 Various amicus briefs have been 
filed supporting the plaintiffs, including a bipartisan brief by Senators 
Graham and Whitehouse.47 The Senators allege that Arab Bank “used 
its U.S. office to launder funds for Hamas” and that, if other 
defendants like Arab Bank cannot be sued under the ATCA in federal 
court for their U.S.-based transactions, this will create “a dangerous 
gap that terrorists and their funders may exploit.”48  
Jesner Bank has countered the plaintiffs’ arguments by relying on 
Sosa. The Bank argues that, in light of Sosa, the plaintiffs’ case can 
go forward only if plaintiffs can show “that corporate liability is 
universally recognized in international law.”49 Jesner Bank argues that 
plaintiffs have failed to establish an international law norm on 
corporate liability because plaintiffs have failed to “point the Court to 
a single instance of a corporation being held liable by an international 
tribunal under customary international law.”50 The Bank also 
highlights a potential discrepancy that extending ATCA liability to 
corporations would create: under United States’ law, corporations do 
not face liability in similar areas of the law, such as private lawsuits 
seeking damages for civil rights violations, under the Supreme Court 
1972 Bivens holding.51 Moreover, Jesner Bank dismisses the Senators’ 
argument that not extending the ATCA’s reach to corporate behavior 
would create a “gap” which future terrorists could exploit.52 The Bank 
suggests that other remedies to combat terrorism are available, such 
as criminal law, federal regulations, and sanctions regimes.53 
 
46. Id.  
47. Id. 
48. Brief of United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey 
Graham as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5-6, Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, 2017 WL 2822776 (No. 16-499). 
49. Howe, supra note 1.   
50. Id.   
51. Id; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (stating implied actions to enforce 
constitutional guarantees against federal actions are not available 
against corporations); see also Anton Metlitsky, Symposium: A Federal-
Common-Law Approach to Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, SCOTUSBLOG, July 26, 2017, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-federal-common-law-
approach-corporate-liability-alien-tort-statute/)[https://perma.cc/JB66-
9W2K ]. 
52. Howe, supra note 1.   
53. Id. 
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According to the Bank, such other remedies are more appropriate 
because they allow prosecutors and regulators discretion to exercise 
judgment in “an area fraught with foreign policy considerations.”54 
The Bank argues that private plaintiffs do not typically exercise the 
same discretion and judgment.55 Jesner Bank is supported through 
amicus briefs by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business 
groups.56 These groups argue that ATCA lawsuits have run rampant 
over the past decades.57 They also highlight that allowing corporate 
liability under the ATCA would create an imbalance that Congress 
certainly did not intend with a similar federal law, the Torture 
Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which allows American plaintiffs to 
sue individuals only.58 As such, they argue extending the ATCA to 
corporations would allow aliens to sue private individuals and 
corporations, while the TVPA would continue to limit American 
citizens’ lawsuits to individual defendants.59 While it is not surprising 
that the business community seems united against extending ATCA 
liability to corporations, this “imbalance” argument is important and 
will most likely be addressed in the near-future Jesner holding.60  
The federal government has taken a middle-ground position in its 
amicus brief to the Supreme Court.61 The government has rejected the 
Bank’s argument that corporations should never face liability under 
the ATCA.62 However, the government has argued that this particular 
lawsuit should not go forward because the allegation that Jesner Bank 
 
54. Id.   
55. Id. 
56. Id.   
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et 
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 6-7, Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, PLC (2017) (No. 16-499); see also Metlitsky, supra note 51 
(noting that the TVPA does not allow plaintiffs to sue corporations) 
(“The relevant statute here is the Torture Victim Protection Act, which 
was enacted by Congress under the ATS to create an express cause of 
action for certain human-rights norms (i.e., torture and extrajudicial 
killing). In creating that cause of action, Congress determined that only 
natural persons, not corporations, could be liable, as the Supreme Court 
held in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority.”). 
60. See generally Howe, supra note 1.  
61. Id. 
62. Brief for the United States of America as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party at 5, Jesner, et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC (2017) (No. 16-
499) (“This Court should vacate the decision below, which rests on the 
mistaken premise that a federal commonlaw claim under the ATS may 
never be brought against a corporation.”). 
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may have routed foreign transactions in dollars through U.S. branches 
does not constitute enough of a nexus and connection with the United 
States per Kiobel.63 It is interesting to note that Jesner Bank itself 
made a similar argument to the Supreme Court last year, in order to 
prevent the court’s review.64 The Bank argued that the Court should 
not address the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA in this 
particular case because the plaintiffs’ claims “do not have a sufficient 
nexus to the United States to be litigated in U.S. courts.”65 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument when it granted certiorari on 
the very issue of corporate liability under the ATCA (although the 
court will certainly address, in its future holding, issues related to the 
required territorial nexus between the claims and the United States).66 
Section II below will discuss the previously-mentioned Kiobel case and 
its requirement of territorial connection between ATCA claims and 
the United States. 
II. Kiobel v. Dutch Royal Petroleum 
In Kiobel, plaintiffs were former residents of Ogoniland, Nigeria, 
who filed a lawsuit under the ATCA in United States federal court 
against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Shell Transport and 
Trading Company, and their joint subsidiary, Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria.67 Plaintiffs alleged that they began 
protesting against the environmental effects of the oil companies’ 
activities in the Ogoniland region, and that, as a consequence, the 
defendants recruited the Nigerian government to crush 
demonstrations by carrying out acts of violence, such as rape and 
murder, and by looting property.68 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged 
that defendants “aided and abetted these atrocities by, among other 
things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and 
compensation, as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use 
respondents’ property as a staging ground for the attacks.”69 Plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants violated the law of nations – a required 
 
63. Id. at 25.  
64. Brief in Opposition at 2, Jesner, et al. v. Arab Bank, PLC (2016) (No. 
16-499) (“If the Court were to grant certiorari in this case, it would be 
Kiobel all over again: the Court would quickly discover that there is no 
need to reach the question of corporate liability because Petitioners’ 
ATS claims do not have a sufficient nexus to the United States to be 
litigated in U.S. court.”). 
65. Id.   
66. Howe, supra note 2.   
67. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1662.   
68. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1662.   
69. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1662.     
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element of an ATCA-based complaint - by aiding and abetting the 
Nigerian government in committing the following acts: (1) 
extrajudicial killings, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) torture and 
cruel treatment, (4) arbitrary arrest and detention, (5) violations of 
the right to life, liberty, security, and association, (6) forced exile, and 
(7) property destruction.70  The district court dismissed some of the 
claims but upheld the second, third, and fourth claims; in addition, 
the district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal.71 In 
contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
entire complaint by holding that “the law of nations does not 
recognize corporate liability.”72The Second Circuit’s holding was 
criticized on various points, including on the argument that it 
misinterpreted part of the Nuremberg precedent.73 As a result, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, originally on the issue of corporate 
liability under the ATCA.74 However, upon hearing oral arguments, 
the Court directed the parties to submit briefs on an additional issue 
– “[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATCA] allows courts 
to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”75   
The Supreme Court thus changed the legal issue that it had 
originally agreed to address in Kiobel. By requesting parties to 
prepare briefs and arguments on the issue of whether a corporation 
may be sued under the ATCA for acts committed abroad (which may 
have violated the law of nations), the Supreme Court avoided directly 
addressing the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA.76 “Rather 
than address whether corporations may be sued at all under the ATS, 
the Court decided to address whether corporations may be sued under 
the ATS for acts committed outside the territory of the United 
States.”77 Thus, in Kiobel, the Supreme Court determined that the 
issue was not “whether petitioners … stated a proper claim under the 
ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the 
territory of a foreign sovereign.”78   
 
70. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663. 
71. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663. 
72. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663. 
73. Michael Kelly, Atrocities by Corporate Actors: An Historical 
Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. (2018). 
74. Id.  
75. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663. 
76. Kelly, supra note 73.   
77. Id.    
78. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664.  
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The Court then held that in analyzing any congressional statute, 
a presumption against extraterritorial application is generally applied. 
This presumption is applied because it “serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which 
could result in international discord.”79 This presumption, according 
to the Kiobel decision, also applies to causes of action under the 
ATCA. The presumption against extraterritorial application may be 
overcome if the statute in question manifests a “clear indication of 
extraterritoriality.”80 According to the Court, the language of the 
ATCA did not indicate such clear extraterritoriality intent, and 
nothing in the statute’s historical background suggested that Congress 
had intended for the statute to have such extraterritorial 
application.81 The Court reached this determination by analyzing the 
three well-recognized law of nations offenses in 1789: violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.82 
According to the Court, the first two offenses were defined as taking 
place within the forum nation and as such could not support the 
argument that Congress must have intended the ATCA to have an 
extraterritorial reach.83 Piracy, according to the Court, is a unique 
offense because it is not committed within the territory of any 
particular nation, and the application of the ATCA to pirates does 
not demonstrate a clear intent by Congress to apply this statute 
extraterritorially for any other offenses.84 Thus, the Court determined 
that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims 
under the ATS” and that “nothing in the statute rebuts that 
presumption.”85 
The Court then applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to the facts in Kiobel. In this case, the defendants’ 
alleged violations of the law of nations occurred abroad. The Court 
held that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of 
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”86 According to 
the Court, for claims against multinational corporations, which may 
be present in many different countries, “mere corporate presence” in 
 
79. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664, (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
80. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1665, (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010)). 
81. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1661, (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723-34).   
82. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1671, (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715).   
83. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1666-67. 
84. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1667. 
85. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. 
86. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. 
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the United States does not suffice.87 The Court thus affirmed the 
Second Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, not on the ground 
that corporations may never be sued under the ATCA, but because 
the “touch and concern” territoriality nexus with the United States 
was not present in the Kiobel facts and allegations.88 In Jesner, the 
Supreme Court may be attempting to clarify the issue of potential 
corporate liability under the ATCA, which Kiobel left open. Section 
III below will discuss the most important issues left unanswered by 
Kiobel, as well as the implications of such issues on the Jesner case.   
III. Kiobel and Questions Left Unanswered 
The Kiobel opinion has been criticized on different grounds. This 
Section will focus on two common criticisms: Kiobel’s reliance on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the majority opinion’s 
failure to explain how this presumption may be overcome, and 
Kiobel’s failure to explain which laws – international or domestic – 
should govern the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA.89 This 
Section will also discuss Kiobel’s implications on Jesner and it will 
predict how the Supreme Court may apply Kiobel’s framework to 
Jesner.    
A. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: Failure to Explain How It 
May be Overcome 
Kiobel failed to explain what factors would potentially displace 
the presumption of territoriality regarding the ATCA, and what 
factors would need to be present in future cases in order to justify the 
extraterritorial application of this statute.90 Both Justice Kennedy and 
Justice Breyer wrote concurring opinions in which they challenged the 
majority opinion’s reliance on the presumption of territoriality.91 
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court left a “number of 
significant questions” open regarding the future scope and 
interpretation of the ATCA.92 On the other hand, Justice Breyer 
noted that the Court’s reliance on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality “offers only limited help in deciding the question 
presented, namely, ‘under what circumstances the [ATCA] … allows 
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
 
87. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. 
88. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. 
89. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1672-73. 
90. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1672-73. 
91. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 
1672-73 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
92. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
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nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.’”93 Justice Breyer further argued that although the 
majority opinion made clear that an ATCA claim would have to 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States…. With 
sufficient force to displace the presumption,” the majority opinion 
“leaves for another day the determination of just when the 
presumption against extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’”94 
Instead, Justice Breyer proposed a different framework for recognizing 
future causes of action under the ACTA. According to Justice Breyer, 
jurisdiction should exist under the ATCA where “(1) the alleged tort 
occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or 
(3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American interest in preventing the United States from 
becoming a safe harbor (free or civil as well as criminal liability) for a 
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”95   
In sum, although Kiobel explicitly held that ATS claims must 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States” with “sufficient 
force” in order to overcome ATCA’s presumption of territoriality, 
commentators and lower courts have been left wondering as to what 
exactly constitutes such “touch and concern” connection with the 
United States.96 Despite the Kiobel holding, one commentator has 
argued that the ATCA still “has the potential to provide a foreigner 
with a civil remedy from a U.S. court based upon a variety of 
customary international law violations committed by a foreign 
national and occurring in the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.”97 Moreover, since Kiobel, lower courts have reached 
conflicting results regarding claims brought under the ATCA.98 One 
scholar has summarized the lower courts’ decisions when interpreting 
the ATCA and the Kiobel mandate to apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as follows.99 One set of courts have interpreted 
Kiobel to require that the presumption of extraterritoriality may only 
be overcome if the law of nations violation occurs in the United 
 
93. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
94. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1673. 
95. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1671. 
96. See, e.g., Paul L. Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First 
Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 28, 35 (2013) (stating it is 
unclear that foreign corporations with more extensive United States 
connections would pass the presumption).  
97. Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining 
Balancing Factors from Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 66 
HASTINGS L. J.  443, 446-447 (2015).  
98. Id. at 455-56.   
99. Id.   
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States.100 Another set of courts interpret Kiobel to require that only 
relevant conduct, and not the law of nations violation itself, occur in 
the United States.101 A third group of courts have decided that Kiobel 
allows U.S. citizenship or residency to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.102 A fourth set of courts have reached the 
opposite conclusion and have held that U.S. citizenship or residency is 
not sufficient to displace the presumption.103 Finally, a fifth set of 
courts have interpreted Kiobel as acknowledging that only Congress 
can displace a statute’s presumption against extraterritoriality.104 
Some courts have heard ATCA cases without even addressing the 
Kiobel “touch and concern” test.105 According to one scholar, these 
conflicting lower court opinions “show the need for a coherent test to 
determine when the presumption against the extraterritorial 
application of a statute should be displaced.”106   
The differing approaches taken by lower courts in ATCA 
litigation post-Kiobel clearly demonstrate the necessity for a unified 
approach – which the Supreme Court will hopefully provide in Jesner. 
Until then, the unsettled issues regarding the “touch and concern” 
standard and the presumption against extraterritoriality are likely to 
contribute to forum shopping, where savvy plaintiffs will continue to 
bring cases in ATSA-friendly districts and circuits. It may be that the 
Supreme Court forecloses corporate liability under the ATCA 
altogether in Jesner, but in this author’s opinion, it is much more 
likely that the Supreme Court will clarify Kiobel and allow a limited 
number of ATCA lawsuits against corporations.   
B. Applicable Law (Domestic or International) to the Issue of 
Corporate Liability Under the ATCA 
Another question left unanswered by Kiobel was one of applicable 
law: which law, domestic or international, applies to the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATCA.107 In other words, to determine 
whether corporations can be sued for human rights violations, does 
one look to American tort law or to international law? Some scholars 
have argued that the ATCA is a conduct-regulating statute which 
incorporates universal norms of the law of nations; thus, according to 
 
100. Id.   
101. Id.   
102. Id.  
103. Id.   
104. Id. at 456. 
105. Id. at 456-58.  
106. Id. at 456. 
107. Alford, supra note 32, at 1100.   
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this argument, ATCA is a universal jurisdiction statute.108 In this 
vein, scholars argue that “[w]hen states exercise universal jurisdiction, 
they do not apply solely national law to conduct beyond their borders 
but an international law that already applied to the conduct when 
and where it occurred.”109 
Thus, pursuant to this argument, the relevant law to query 
regarding the issue of corporate liability for aiding and abetting in 
human rights abuses under a universal jurisdiction statute like the 
ATCA would be international law.110 In other words, as a conduct-
regulating statute, the ATCA, refers to the law of nations and 
incorporates law of nations norms as to liability, it may be argued 
that the only relevant question for ATCA claims is whether such 
claims “was whether the conduct-regulating rule of decision in ATS 
suits— however it is conceptualized—accurately reflects extant rules 
of international law, including as to the scope of liability.”111 Thus, 
when it comes to the existence of corporate liability under the ATCA, 
the only relevant inquiry is whether existing international law norms 
authorize such liability.112    
Similarly, another scholar has argued toward the application of 
international law to the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA, 
stating  
[t]o me, it has always seemed that any questions affecting the 
substance of a case against an ATS defendants should be 
governed by international law, as the ATS’ text seems to 
demand. The temptation to fill in the many gaps left by 
international law with U.S. common law is strong, but the ATS 
clearly sought to ask US courts to apply international law.113  
If one accepts the argument that the issue of corporate liability under 
the ATCA should be governed by international, not domestic law, one 
may conclude against extending ATCA liability to corporations 
because international law does not contain clear and universally 
 
108. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of 
Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329, 1332 (2013).  
109. Id. at 1330-34.  
110. Id. at 1333. 
111. Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between 
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65, 67 
(2013). 
112. Id. at 70.   
113. Julian Ku, The Unattractive Question is Back: SCOTUS (Again) 
Considers Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, OPINIO 
JURIS (April 3, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/03/unattractive-
question-back-scotus-considers-corporate-liability-alien-tort-statute/ 
[https://perma.cc/EJQ6-26C2]. 
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accepted norms on civil liability for corporations.114 In other words, 
because the Sosa case already limited the ability of federal courts to 
recognize as actionable norms under the ATCA to those norms that 
are sufficiently uniform, definite and accepted under international law, 
it may be argued that U.S. courts should not be embracing novel 
causes of action against corporations when international law does not 
uniformly establish civil liability for corporations for aiding and 
abetting in human rights violations.115 If, however, the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATCA is to be determined under 
domestic law, then an analysis of American federal law would lead 
one to conclude that corporations may face liability in civil lawsuits, 
given that “[u]nder federal common law, corporations are typically 
liable for torts.”116 As a result, the application of this law would 
almost certainly favor the plaintiffs on this question.”117 
The Kiobel majority never reached a definite conclusion on this 
issue of applicable law.118 Instead, in Kiobel, the Supreme Court 
seemed to distinguish between conduct-regulating norms, which for an 
ATCA claim are found in the law of nations, and causes of action and 
remedies, which are to be determined by the law of the forum.119 “The 
law of nations creates liability for universal jurisdiction violations, and 
the ATS supplies the form of remedy.120 In Kiobel, the Supreme Court 
found that although the ATCA – the conduct-regulating statute – 
was jurisdictional in nature and incorporated the law of nations, the 
relevant cause of action under the ATCA was domestic and 
determined by the law of the forum.121 It may be that the Kiobel 
majority would have answered the issue of corporate liability under 
the ATCA under the law of the forum/domestic law, if this issue had 
actually been addressed. However, because the Kiobel majority 
ultimately determined that the case should be dismissed on extra-
territoriality grounds, the issue of applicable law remained 
 
114. See Daniel Price, Corporate Liability for International Torts: Did the 
Second Circuit Misinterpret the Alien Tort Statute?, 8 SETON HALL CIR. 
REV. 43, 55 (2011) (discussing Judge Cabranes’ majority opinion in 
Kiobel).   
115. See generally Kevin Golden, License to Kill? Corporate Liability Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 1 IN THE BALANCE 37, 44 (2012). 
116. Ku, supra note 113.   
117. Id.  
118. Alford, supra note 32, at 1100.   
119. See Colangelo, supra note 108, at 1332.   
120. Id. at 1344. 
121. See Colangelo, supra note 111, at 67 (discussing the questions presented 
for re-argument in Kiobel).  
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unanswered.122 It may be that this issue will ultimately be resolved in 
Jesner.  
C. Implications for Jesner 
In Jesner, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATCA, presumably to clarify post-Kiobel 
confusion.123 It is worth noting that the Court adopted the plaintiffs’ 
formulation of the issue: “[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350, categorically forecloses corporate liability.”124  By doing this, 
the Court may have signaled that it will likely side with the plaintiffs 
(it would be difficult to imagine that the Court would hold that 
corporations are always and categorically exempt from liability under 
the ATCA).125 Moreover, the fact that the Court granted certiorari on 
the issue of corporate liability under the ATCA, which the Court had 
avoided in Kiobel, may signal that the Court is willing to tackle this 
issue directly and that it is willing to seriously entertain the plaintiffs’ 
argument.126 With these two points in mind, it is this author’s opinion 
that the Court will likely side with the plaintiffs, but that it will 
strictly limit corporate liability under the ATCA to a narrow set of 
circumstances.   
If the Court were to decide that corporations may be sued under 
the ATCA post-Kiobel, it will have to clarify that Kiobel does not 
foreclose corporate liability altogether under this statute. In addition, 
the Court will have to determine, assuming that it does not want to 
overturn Kiobel a mere four years after it was decided, that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome in Jesner. 
In order to do this, the Court may have to explain in more detail how 
plaintiffs in an ATCA case may overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, and what factors in particular are necessary in 
order to overcome that presumption. Jesner may thus turn into an 
application and clarification of Kiobel – a way for the Supreme Court 
to resolve post-Kiobel circuit court splits relating to the ambiguity of 
the Kiobel “touch and concern” test.127 If Jesner were to do this, it 
would be a welcome development in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
How likely is it that the Supreme Court will decide in favor of 
plaintiffs in the Jesner case? In Jesner, the law of nations violation of 
 
122. See Alford, supra note 32, at 1097 (explaining the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kiobel).  
123. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). 
124. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 808 F.3d 144 (2017).  
125. Id. (explaining that the Supreme Court will decide whether ATCA 
categorically forecloses corporate liability).   
126. Id. 
127. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669. 
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terrorism took place in Israel, West Bank, or Gaza.128 However, Arab 
Bank is being sued for having aided and abetted terrorist activity 
through particular financing operations.129 This law of nations 
violation (aiding and abetting terrorism) presumably took place at 
different Arab Bank locations and branches.130 If plaintiffs can 
demonstrate that a sufficient number of such financing operations 
took place in Arab Bank’s United States branches, this may 
constitute enough relevant conduct that would “touch and concern” 
the United States and thus displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.131 The Court may also focus on the alleged 
violation of the law of nations itself, aiding and abetting terrorism, 
and may decide that deterring terrorism and terrorism financing 
sufficiently “touches and concerns” the United States because of a 
global American national security interests in preventing terrorist 
activity.132 This kind of ruling would focus on terrorism as a 
particularly grave offense under the law of nations and would disallow 
other types of ATCA claims where plaintiffs allege other human 
rights violations. Under these circumstances, the Court would thus 
establish a narrow precedent for future ATCA cases against corporate 
defendants, by allowing only cases involving terrorism and terrorism-
like violations of the law of nations, within a paradigm where United 
States’ national security interests are concerned.     
If the Supreme Court were to decide in favor of the respondents 
in Jesner and to hold that corporations are indeed categorically 
exempt from liability under the ATCA, this would not necessarily 
imply that no remedies would be available in American courts against 
corporations which aid and abet in human rights violations.133 The 
section below will briefly outline other potential remedies against 
corporate misbehavior.   
 
128. Howe, supra note 1.   
129. Id.   
130. Id. 
131. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(explaining Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test).  
132. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(discussing the existence of ATS jurisdiction when there is an important 
national interest).  
133. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R43293, CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW (2013) (discussing 
instances when corporations may be held criminally liable). 
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IV. Other Remedies for Corporate Human Rights 
Violations 
If the Supreme Court decides in favor of the respondents in the 
Jesner case, this will bring to end federal court litigation under the 
ATCA against corporate defendants. Corporations would not, 
however, be completely immune from liability in the United States.134 
Instead, corporations could still face criminal liability in United 
States’ courts, and corporate officers themselves could continue to 
face civil lawsuits for their individual roles in aiding and abetting 
human rights abuses.135   
First, it is well established in United States’ law that corporations 
may face criminal liability for various misdeeds.136 Under federal law, 
corporations and other legal entities may be criminally liable for the 
crimes of their employees and agents.137 Corporations face criminal 
liability for violations of regulatory offenses, such as the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, economic offenses, crimes in violation of the 
 
134. See id. (detailing the Supreme Court view that corporations should be 
held responsible for their agents and are not immune).  
135. See id. at 4 (“As a general rule, ‘[c]orporations may be held liable for 
specific intent offenses based on the ‘knowledge and intent’ of their 
employees.”).  
136. See id. at 3 (discussing instances when corporations are held liable for 
criminal offenses). 
137. See id; See also United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 552-53 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (holding a corporation liable for the criminal acts of its 
agent); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1118 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding a corporation’s intent is dependent on the 
wrongful intent of their employees); United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 
236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing a corporation’s liability is 
dependent on the wrongful acts of their employees with the intent to 
benefit the corporation); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 236, 249 
(4th Cir. 2008) (finding that all the officers, agents, and employees were 
acting within the scope of his or her employment when the criminal act 
was committed); United States v. Investment Enterprises, Inc., 10 F.3d 
263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Bi-Co Paxers, Inc., 741 
F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1984)); United States v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that an 
extensive compliance program does not immunize the corporation from 
liability); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that a corporate defendant is guilty if it can be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that acts and omission committed are done by 
company employees within the scope of their employment); United 
States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding jury 
instructions saying that corporations are liable for the acts of an agent 
even if it’s contrary to corporation’s instructions proper); United States 
v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963) (acknowledging that 
corporations may be convicted of a crime through the conduct of its 
agents and employees). 
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securities laws, as well as common law crimes, such as prostitution.138 
Under “federal law, corporate criminal liability is ordinarily confined 
to offenses (a) committed by the corporation’s officers, employees, or 
agents; (b) within the scope of their employment; and (c) at least in 
part for the benefit of the corporation.”139 The Model Penal Code, as 
well as numerous state statutes, provide for corporate criminal 
liability in case of significant misdeeds by senior corporate officers.140 
Thus, under United States’ law, corporations, even if exempt from 
ATCA liability, would continue to face the possibility of criminal 
prosecution directed at the corporate entity itself.   
Under international criminal law, corporations have not 
traditionally faced criminal liability.141 The Nuremberg tribunal 
famously declined to prosecute the Farben and Krupp corporations 
and instead focused on prosecuting their corporate officers.142 When 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was negotiated, 
the decision was made to exclude corporate liability from the statute 
– despite proposals to the contrary.143 The statutes of other ad hoc 
tribunals, such as the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, also did not 
extend criminal responsibility to corporations.144 However, more 
recently, international criminal law has been evolving to consider the 
concept of corporate criminal responsibility.145 In addition, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon recently held contempt proceedings against a 
corporation,146 and the new Malabo Protocol extended the jurisdiction 
 
138. See Doyle, supra note 133, at 1.  
139. Id. at 3. 
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144. See id. at 357-58 (noting that the tribunals focused primarily on the 
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145. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability 
Volume 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path, at 1 (2008). 
146. See Special Tribunal of Lebanon, Al Jadeed S.A.L. & Ms Khayat , 
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05 
[https://perma.cc/YS5A-U4ZR ] (Last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (outlining 
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Khayat). 
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of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples 
Right to corporations.147 Thus, it may be argued that even under 
international criminal law, the concept of corporate criminal 
responsibility is an emerging norm. As the Appeals Chamber of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon held in the contempt case, “[c]orporate 
criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the 
status of a general principle of law applicable under international 
law.”.148 In sum, corporations may face criminal liability under 
domestic law in the United States, and they may, in the near future, 
also face liability under international criminal law within future ad 
hoc tribunals.   
Imposing criminal responsibility on corporations may be 
preferable to allowing lawsuits under the ATCA.149 First, criminal 
prosecutions are initiated by prosecutors who often exercise 
tremendous discretion before initiating a potentially difficult corporate 
case.150 In the case of foreign corporations, prosecutors could arguably 
exercise additional discretion to ensure that United States’ foreign 
relations were not undermined. Private plaintiffs bringing lawsuits 
under the ATCA typically do not have foreign relations-based 
concerns and almost all scholars have recognized that ATCA lawsuits 
 
147. Several scholars and international bodies are in favor of extending 
criminal liability to corporations. See generally Payam Akhavan, Are 
International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace? Reconciling 
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(2009); see also B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and 
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Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in 
Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 67 (Oct. 2, 2014) (Special Trib. for Lebanon).  
149. See James G. Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for 
International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. 
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have significant potential to disrupt foreign relations.151 Thus, criminal 
prosecutions against foreign corporations which may have aided and 
abetted in human rights abuses may be beneficial over privately-
initiated lawsuits under the ATCA. 
Second, corporations, if convicted in a criminal trial, may face 
stiff penalties and reputational harm.152 Although ATCA plaintiffs 
have been, in some instances, able to collect significant damages from 
corporate defendants, damages in a private lawsuit produce much less 
reputational and financial harm than criminal penalties.153 In addition, 
some ATCA plaintiffs have settled their cases against corporations, 
and in these instances, damages paid by the relevant corporation 
remain unknown and typically do little to harm the corporation’s 
reputation.154 Finally, criminal prosecutions against corporations for 
human rights violations may lead toward the drafting of more 
stringent legislation and regulations concerning corporations, which 
may ultimately lead toward improving corporate behavior.   
Third, in addition to prosecuting corporations in the criminal 
system, corporate officers themselves may face both civil and criminal 
liability.155 Even if the Jesner court were to foreclose corporate 
liability under the ATCA, the statute could remain to be used against 
individual corporate officers as defendants. In addition, corporate 
officers could face criminal liability in United States’ courts, if 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that corporate officers somehow 
individually committed or contributed toward the commission of 
human rights violations.156 While individual corporate officers’ pockets 
may be less deep than those of multinational corporations and this 
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(explaining that several cases against individual officers have been 
brought before civil and criminal courts in the U.S.).  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations 
149 
option less attractive to ATCA plaintiffs, ATCA-based lawsuits 
against corporate officers combined with criminal prosecutions against 
corporations would go a long way toward deterring future corporate 
human rights violations.157 This general outcome may benefit ATCA 
plaintiffs as a class of individuals having suffered human rights 
violations, with a significant interest in preventing and deterring 
future abuses.158   
Conclusion 
While it remains uncertain how the Supreme Court will decide in 
Jesner, the case will hopefully clarify Kiobel’s uncertainties with 
respect to the presumption of extraterritoriality, and with respect to 
the issue of applicable law.159 It is this author’s opinion that in light of 
the way in which the Supreme Court formulated the legal issue, and 
in light of the fact that the Court granted certiorari only four years 
post-Kiobel, the Court will more likely rule in favor of the 
plaintiffs/petitioners. If the Court were to rule in favor of the 
plaintiffs/petitioners, it will most likely issue a narrow holding which 
will limit future ATCA cases against corporations to only certain 
types of claims (like terrorism) and to corporations with significant 
nexus to the United States. Furthermore, if the Court were to rule in 
favor of extending ATCA liability to corporations, it is likely that the 
Court would decide that the issue of corporate liability itself should 
be governed by domestic law, as opposed to international law. Finally, 
even if the Court were to rule in favor of the defendants/respondents, 
foreclosing corporate liability under the ATCA, corporations could 
still face judicial scrutiny in the United States. Corporations would 
continue to face criminal liability in United States’ courts (which may 
be preferable to private lawsuits under the ATCA), and corporate 
officers themselves would continue to face both civil and criminal 
 
157. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal 
Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law, 8 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 909, 915 (2010) (arguing that the impact of criminal 
prosecution on a corporation’s good name is “graver” and “…adds to the 
deterrent effect”). 
158. See Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law: Corporate 
Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2025, 2041 (2001) (explaining that judgments would have a 
“general deterrent effect” by incentivizing corporations to internalize 
liability considerations). 
159. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 
16-499 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2017) (counsel for the U.S. acknowledging that the 
Second Circuit had not reached the extraterritoriality question because 
“…it relied on its rule that a corporation can never be a defendant in an 
Alien Tort Statute.”).  
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liability.160 It is thus this author’s opinion that despite the relatively 
high likelihood that the Supreme Court will decide in favor of 
plaintiffs/petitioners, it would be preferable to limit corporate liability 
under the ATCA. International law does not contain a universal norm 
on civil corporate liability, and criminal prosecutions against 
corporations and judicial processes directed against corporate officers 
may deter future corporate misbehavior better than an ATCA-based 
private lawsuit, without disrupting United States’ foreign relations.161   
 
 
160. See Stewart, supra note 149, at 142 (describing the ATS as similar to 
other “safety net[s]” allowing the prosecution of individuals when a 
corporation is immune). 
161. See Daniel Prince, Corporate Liability For International Torts: Did The 
Second Circuit Misinterpret The Alien Tort Statute?, 8 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 43, 57 (2012) (noting that corporate liability has not “ripened 
into a specific, universal, obligatory norm of international law”). 
